I n t r odu ct ion
The welfare st at e aim s t o reduce incom e inequalit y bet ween individuals. People differ in t heir t alent , socio-econom ic back gr ound and oppor t unit ies. The m ark et process t hen r esult s in lar ge differ ences in incom e levels. Governm ent s achieve int erpersonal redist ribut ion of m arket incom es t hrough t axes and social benefit s ( cash benefit s and benefit s in kind) . I n recent years considerable progress has been m ade in em pirical research on t he im pact of social prot ect ion syst em s on incom e inequalit y. But m ost analyses of social prot ect ion are focussed on public arrangem ent s. However, social effort is not rest rict ed t o t he public dom ain; all kinds of privat e arrangem ent s can be subst it ut es t o public pr ogr am s. The OECD has recent ly done a com prehensive st udy on public and privat e social expendit ure ( Adem a, 2001; Adem a and Ledaique, 2005) . They define pr iv at e pr ogr am s as 'social' when t hey serve a social purpose, ar e subj ect t o governm ent int ervent ion and cont ain an elem ent of int erpersonal redist ribut ion. The dat a gat hered by t he OECD show t hat such privat e social arrangem ent s have a subst ant ial size in m any count ries. I n fact , in several count ries welfare st at e reform s have caused a shift from public t owards privat e social expendit ures. Our quest ion is whet her such a shift from public t o privat e social arrangem ent s affect s t he redist ribut ive im pact of t he w elfar e st at e. Theor et ically, it is plausible t hat public and privat e arrangem ent s in social prot ect ion sy st em s hav e dissim ilar dist r ibut ional effect s. I n t his paper, w e will em pirically invest igat e t he relat ionship, if any, bet ween cross-count ry differences in public and privat e social expendit ure and the distribution of income in a number of wealthy nations. To that end, we will use more recent dat a on priv at e social expendit ur e t han in earlier work ( Cam inada and Goudswaard, 2005) . We analyse t he effect s of account ing for privat e social benefit s on social prot ect ion st at ist ics, and link bot h public social spending and privat e social spending t o indicat ors of incom e inequalit y and incom e redist ribut ion. Our purpose is t o present a sim ple and int uit ive analysis which elaborat es on previous work. The aim of t he paper is not t o explain t he household incom e dist ribut ion across count ries, nor will we discuss t he direct ion of t he causalit y of t he relat ionship bet ween cross-count ry differences in incom e inequalit y and t he levels of social spending. Such an analysis should be based on a t heory which would have t o addr ess sev eral cross-nat ional differ ences explaining t he household incom e dist ribut ion ( cf. Got t schalk and Sm eeding, 1997) . Such a com prehensive approach is far beyond t he scope of t his paper. This cont ribut ion is st ruct ured as follows. Sect ion 2 sum m arises em pirical result s of t he level of incom e inequalit y and incom e redist ribut ion t hrough t he welfare st at e across count ries. I n sect ion 3 we discuss t he nat ur e of privat e social ex pendit ures and show r ecent dat a on t hese ex pendit ur es. I n sect ion 4 we perform several em pirical analyses on public and privat e social expendit ures, and t he dist ribut ion of incom e. Sect ion 5 concludes.
Em pir ica l e vide n ce on in com e in e qu a lit y a n d in com e r e dist r ibu t ion
The best cross-nat ionally com parable collect ion of incom e dat a is t he Luxem bourg I ncom e St udy ( LI S) . LI S was creat ed specifically t o im prove consist ency across count ries. The LI S dat a are a collect ion of m icro dat a-set s obt ained from a range of incom e surveys in various count ries. The advant age of t hese dat a is t hat ext ensive effort s have been m ade by count r y specialist s t o m ake inform at ion on incom e and household charact erist ics as com parable as possible across a large num ber of count ries. The approach adopt ed by LI S overcom es m ost , but not all, of t he problem s of m aking com parisons across count ries t hat plagued earlier st udies ( Sm eeding, 2002) . This sect ion sum m arises t he evidence on cross nat ional com parisons of incom e inequalit y over 29 nat ions based on em pirical evidence from LI S ( Mahler and Jesuit , 2006) . Levels of inequalit y can be shown in several ways, e.g. by Lorenz curves, specific point s on t he percent ile dist ribut ion ( P10 or P90) , decile rat ios ( P90/ P10) , and Gini coefficient s or m any ot her sum m ary st at ist ics of inequalit y. All ( sum m ary) st at ist ics of inequalit y can be used t o rank incom e inequalit y in OECD count ries, but t hey do not always t ell t he sam e st ory. The obvious advant age of t he present at ion of inequalit y by sum m ary st at ist ics is it s abilit y t o sum m arise several nat ions in one pict ure. Figure 1 shows t he m ost oft en used sum m ary m easure of t he incom e dist ribut ion -t he Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable incom e. The Gini coefficient lies bet ween 0 ( no inequalit y and 1 ( m axim um inequalit y) . The figure indicat es t hat a wide range of inequalit y of disposable incom e exist s across developed nat ions, wit h t he nat ion wit h t he highest inequalit y coefficient ( Mexico) over t wice as high as t he nat ion wit h t he lowest coefficient ( Denm ark) . I n anot her st udy ( Cam inada and Goudsw aard, 2001) we have shown t hat incom e inequalit y has risen since t he early 1980's in t he m aj orit y of t he OECD count ries, alt hough it is wrong t o t hink in t erm s of a world-wide t rend ( At kinson, 2000) . ) . These differences are oft en at t ribut ed t o social policies. Först er's em pirical analyses showed t hat in m ost developed count ries, bet ween one t hird and 45 percent of all public t ransfers goes t o t he lower incom es. Korpi and Palm e ( 1998) , for exam ple, showed t hat welfare st at es wit h generous social insurance program s r edist ribut e econom ic resources m ore effect ively and have a m ore equal dist ribut ion of incom es t han welfare st at es wit h less generous insurance schem es. I n general, t ax/ t ransfer syst em s as a whole reduce m arket -incom e inequalit y in all OECD count ries.
Usually t he im pact of social policy on t he dist ribut ions of incom e is calculat ed in line wit h t he work of Musgrave, Case and Leonard ( 1974) , i.e. st at ut ory or budget incidence analysis. That is, im port ant issues of t ax/ t r ansfer shift ing and behavioural responses are ignored. 1 The m easure of t he redist ribut ive im pact of social prot ect ion on inequalit y is st raight forwardly based on form ulas developed by Kakwani ( 1986) and Ringen ( 1991) :
Redist ribut ion by governm ent = ( prim ary incom e -disposable incom e) / ( prim ary incom e) x 100. Figure 2 shows t he reduct ion in inequalit y caused by social prot ect ion, where prim ary incom e inequalit y is given by a sum m ary st at ist ic of pre-t ax, pre-t ransfer m arket incom es and disposable incom e inequalit y is given by t he sam e sum m ary st at ist ic of disposable equivalent incom es. The figure shows t he Gini incom e inequalit y before and aft er t ax es/ t ransfers and t he inequalit y reduct ion coefficient in 22 count ries around t he year 2000. Tax es and t ransfers reduce t he Gini by on average 26 percent . For exam ple Sweden, Denm ark and Germ any achieve a great er redist ribut ion of econom ic resources ( m ore t han 40 percent ) com pared t o Canada, Spain, Swit zerland and t he Unit ed St at es. I t t urns out t hat t he lat t er count ries are in fact t hose wit h t he least equalit y, while Sweden, Denm ark, and Norway are count ries wit h a rat her low degree of incom e inequalit y. Figure 2 do not show t he redist ribut ive im pact of separat e part s of social prot ect ion syst em s. Recent lit erat ure suggest s t hat t he det erm inat ion of t he relat ionship bet ween social expendit ures and inequalit y should be carried out on a disaggr egat ed basis ( see Swabisch et al, 2003) . Ferrarini and Nelson ( 2002) showed t hat only a lim it ed num ber of st udies have at t em pt ed t o specify t he link bet ween specific social t ransfer program s and incom e inequalit y. Thereby, t he knowledge about t he inst it ut ional st ruct ures t hat produce cert ain dist ribut ive out com es is lim it ed. Especially earlier st udies t hat decom pose inequalit y int o specific t ransfers do not pay sufficient at t ent ion t o t he problem of t axat ion of social insurance. To gain a deeper underst anding of t he redist ribut ive m echanism s of t he welfare st at e it is necessary t o disaggregat e t he social t ransfer syst em int o program specific com ponent s. Recent LI S dat a ( Mahler and Jesuit , 2006) show a rough disaggregat ion for a num ber of count ries. Table 1 indicat es t hat on average 24 percent of t he redist ribut ive im pact of t he welfare st at e can be at t ribut ed t o t axes and 76 percent t o t ransfers. However, t he differences bet ween count ries are quit e large: in t he US 40 per cent of redist ribut ion com es from t axes, while in Swit zerland t axes account for only 2 percent of t ot al redist ribut ion and t ransfers for 98 percent . At t he program level, pensions have by far t he st rongest redist ribut ive im pact . More t han half of t he redist ribut ive im pact of social t ransfers com es from pensions. Unem ploym ent program s do not cont ribut e very subst ant ially t o incom e redist ribut ion, while ot her program s ( disabilit y, healt h insurance, and social assist ance) account on average for 30 percent of t ot al redist ribut ion in t he count ries present ed in Table 1 . 
Pr iva t e socia l e x pe n dit u r e s
The OECD defines social expendit ures as 't he provision by public and privat e inst it ut ions of benefit s t o, and financial cont ribut ions t arget ed at , households and individuals in order t o provide support during circum st ances which adversely affect t heir welfare, provided t hat t he provision of t he benefit s and financial cont ribut ions const it ut es neit her a direct paym ent for a part icular good or service nor an individual cont ract or t ransfer' ( OECD 2007, p. 6) . Since only benefit s provided by inst it ut ions are included in t he social expendit ure definit ion, t ransfers bet w een households -albeit of a social nat ure -are not in t he social dom ain. Social benefit s include cash benefit s ( e.g. pensions, incom e support during m at ernit y leave, and social assist ance paym ent s) , social services ( e.g. childcare, care for t he elderly and disabled) and t ax breaks wit h a social purpose ( e.g. t ax expendit ures t owards fam ilies wit h children, or favourable t ax t reat m ent of cont ribut ions t o privat e healt h plans) .
There are t wo m ain crit eria which have t o be sim ult aneously sat isfied for an expendit ure it em t o be classified as social: 1) t he benefit s hav e t o be int ended t o address one or m ore social pur poses; and
2) program s regulat ing t he provision of benefit s have t o involve eit her int er-personal redist ribut ion, or com pulsory part icipat ion. The dist inct ion bet ween public and privat e social prot ect ion is m ade on t he basis of whoever cont rols t he relevant financial flows; public inst it ut ions or privat e bodies. Wit hin t he gr oup of privat e social benefit s, t w o broad cat egories can be dist inguished: m andat ory and volunt ary privat e social expendit ure. Mandat ory privat e social expendit ure is social support st ipulat ed by legislat ion but operat ed t hrough t he privat e sect or , e.g. dir ect sickness pay m ent s by em ployer s t o t heir absent em ployees as legislat ed by public aut horit ies, or benefit s accr uing from m andat or y cont ribut ions t o privat e insurance funds. I n som e count ries public disabilit y benefit s ( and som et im es unem ploym ent benefit s) can be supplem ent ed by privat e benefit s wit h m andat ory cont ribut ions, agreed upon in collect ive negot iat ions bet ween em ployers and em ployees. Volunt ar y privat e social expendit ur e concerns benefit s accr uing from privat ely oper at ed program s t hat involve t he redist ribut ion of resources across households and include benefit s provided by NGOs, and benefit accr uing fr om t ax advant aged individual plans and collect ive ( oft en em ploym ent -relat ed) support ar rangem ent s, such as for exam ple, pensions, and, in t he US, em ploym ent -r elat ed healt h plans. Table 2 sum m arizes which expendit ures are social and which are not . Table 3 shows public and privat e social expendit ure as a percent age of GDP, for t he m ost recent dat a year 2003. Most social support is publicly provided. I n m ost count ries t he share of public social benefit s in t ot al social expendit ures exceeds 85 percent . However, t he role of privat e arrangem ent s of varying nat ure in providing close subst it ut es t o public social prot ect ion expendit ure is considerable in som e OECD count ries. I n t he Net herlands, Swit zerland, t he Unit ed Kingdom and Korea, t he share of privat e social expendit ure is m ore t han 25 percent , while in t he US t his share is alm ost 40 percent . I n m ost count ries privat e volunt ary expendit ure are dom inant , but t here are except ions: m ainly in Swit zerland m andat ory privat e expendit ures are very high. Figure 3 shows t hat in a num ber of count ries privat e social expendit ures have risen quit e rapidly over t he years. There m ay be various explanat ions for t his increase in privat e social expendit ure in various count ries. Lower public prot ect ion m ay induce privat e social arrangem ent s of different nat ure. But a shift from public t o privat e provision of social prot ect ion can also be an explicit policy obj ect ive, t o alleviat e public budget s, or t o st rengt hen incent ives in t he syst em . For exam ple, t he privat isat ion of t he sickness benefit program in t he Net herlands was direct ed at increasing t he incent ives for em ployers t o reduce t he num ber of beneficiaries. Policy m akers m ay also want t o realize efficiency gains t hrough a shift from public t o privat e provision, because privat e providers have st ronger incent ives t o reduce cost s. Anyway, account ing for privat e social expendit ures is im port ant for j udging t he social effort and t he level of social prot ect ion in count ries. Privat e insurance schem es are act uarially fair as a rule. Most privat e insurances are not earningsrelat ed. I ndividual privat e pension insurances, for exam ple, have a defined cont ribut ion charact er, and t herefor e do not cont ain any elem ent s of ( ex ant e) incom e redist ribut ion. Privat e schem es can also have earnings-relat ed benefit s. I t is som et im es argued t hat earnings-relat ed social insurance benefit s only reproduce inequalit ies in m arket incom e and t herefore do not redist ribut e econom ic resources bet ween incom e segm ent s, in case benefit s are perfect ly earnings-relat ed and t he risk of being in receipt of benefit is equally dist ribut ed in t he populat ion. So, in t hat case a higher share of privat e social prot ect ion will not have any ( part ial) effect on t he dist ribut ion of incom e. However, privat e earnings-relat ed schem es m ay not be act uar ially fair and m ay cont ain elem ent s of solidarit y. This is oft en t he case when ( supplem ent ary) privat e schem es are negot iat ed by social part ners in collect ive labour cont ract s. These schem es are m andat ory for ( a group of) workers. Defined benefit pension schem es, for exam ple, generally redist ribut e resources bot h wit hin generat ions ( for inst ance t hrough redist ribut ive elem ent s such as t hresholds or ceilings) and across generat ions ( risk sharing, back service) . Defined benefit syst em s for early ret irem ent t end t o redist ribut e t o m em bers w ho leave before t he official ret irem ent age from t hose who st ay. I n fact , as I n general, we do expect t hat privat e schem es will generat e less incom e redist ribut ion t han public program s, alt hough at t his st age t he dist ribut ional im pact of t aking account for privat e social schem es in a cross-count ry analysis is not fully clear. Privat e arrangem ent s will likely have less redist ribut ional effect s com pared t o public program s. I n addit ion, it is plausible t hat m ainly higher incom e groups will m ake use of privat e social schem es ( Casey and Yam ada, 2002) . Considering also t hat privat e schem es oft en have favourable t ax t reat m ent ( deduct ibilit y of cont ribut ions) , which benefit s t he rich, it is possible t hat privat e social expendit ure has a posit ive effect on incom e inequalit y . I n ot her w or ds, w e expect incom e inequalit y t o be relat ively high ( low) in count ries where t he share of privat e arrangem ent in t he t ot al social benefit s is relat ively high ( low) .
Th e lin k be t w e e n pu blic/ pr iva t e socia l pr ot e ct ion a nd in com e in e qu a lit y
We perform ed various cr oss-count y analyses of t he relat ionship bet w een public and privat e social ex pendit ures and t he incom e dist ribut ion. 2 Obviously, t his analysis is not very sophist icat ed. The m at erial pr esent ed her e is only descript ive and does not ex plain t he household incom e dist ribut ion. Such an analysis should ideally be based on a t heory, which would have t o address at least t he following cross-nat ional differences ( cf. We find a pret t y good fit of a logarit hm ic OLS-regression wit h t he level of t he Gini and t he level of public social spending as a percent age of GDP ( a sim ilar regression is done by Gouyet t e and Pest ieau, 1999) ; see Table 4 . Using public expendit ure as dependent variable produces t he expect ed negat ive sign, while t he coefficient is st at ist ically significant . I n ot her words, we find a quit e st rong negat ive relat ionship bet ween public social expendit ures and incom e inequalit y. Obviously, public social securit y t ransfers are well-t arget ed t owards t he poor. The pict ure alt ers when we t ake pr ivat e social securit y expendit ures int o account in our analysis; see Figure 4 panel b. A negat ive relat ionship bet ween privat e social expendit ures and inequalit y can not be found; indeed t he relat ionship is slight ly posit ive. This is confirm ed by a sim ple regression analysis report ed in Table 4 . The est im at ed coefficient of privat e expendit ure-variable is posit ive, but not st at ist ically significant . These ar e indicat ions t hat suppor t our hypot hesis t hat public and privat e arrangem ent s in social prot ect ion do have opposit e dist ribut ional effect s. This posit ive ( rat her t han a negat ive) sign m ay reflect t hat higher incom e groups find it easier t o opt in t o privat e social program s. Not e t hat privat e arrangem ent s m it igat e t he im pact of public social effort on incom e inequalit y t o som e ext ent , alt hough t he est im at ed coefficient of t he t ot al expendit ure-variable is st ill negat ive and significant . I n an earlier paper wit h less recent dat a we found t hat , as a result of t he divergent effect s of public social expendit ure versus privat e social expendit ure, t he relat ionship bet ween t ot al social expendit ures and incom e inequalit y across 16 wealt hy count ries appeared t o be st at ist ically t rivial ( Cam inada and Goudsw aard, 2005) . 3 We perform ed a sim ilar analysis of t he relat ionship bet ween public and pr iv at e social expendit ures wit h t he r educt ion in incom e inequalit y caused by incom e t r ansfers ( incom e r edist ribut ion fr om t ax es and social benefit s as defined in sect ion 2) . I n Figure 5 panel a t he ex pect ed relat ionship is shown: count ries wit h a higher level of public social expendit ure have m ore incom e redist ribut ion or m ore reduct ion of t he Gini. Panel b shows t hat t here is no obvious relat ionship bet ween privat e social expendit ures and incom e redist ribut ion. This is confirm ed by t he regression result s in Table 5 . However, we expect t hat privat e schem es will generat e less redist ribut ion from rich t o poor. And indeed, we do not find a st at ist ically significant relat ionship bet ween privat e social expendit ures and incom e inequalit y and incom e redist ribut ion. Consequent ly, changes in t he public/ privat e m ix in t he provision of social prot ect ion m ay affect t he redist ribut ive im pact of t he welfare st at e. Account ing for privat e social arr angem ent s m at t ers as far as t he dist ribut ional im pact of t he social prot ect ion sy st em is concerned.
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Appe n dix : D a t a a n d cor r e la t ion t e st s a cr oss cou n t r ie s
Our research hypot hesis is t hat t he level of public social expendit ur e and incom e inequalit y across count r ies are negat iv ely correlat ed, while privat e social expendit ure m ay have a non-negat ive redist r ibut ional effect . To analyze t his hypot hesis we include 22 count r ies in our dat a set on t he basis of dat a av ailabilit y on bot h I ncom e ( Re) Dist ribut ion m easures and Privat e Social Expendit ure m easures ( gross and/ or net ) . For 19 count r ies all dat a it em s are available. For anot her t hree count r ies -Luxem bourg, Poland and Swit zerland -only dat a of net social expendit ure are m issing ( alt hough dat a on gross privat e social ex pendit ur e is available) , so w e put t hese count ries also in our dat a set . As a result we have perform ed regression analyses w it h t wo dat a set s cont aining 22 respect ively 19 OECD-count ries. Cor r e la t ion t e st s: Lin k a ge be t w e e n LI S in com e dist r ibu t ion m e a su r e s a n d gr oss a n d n e t socia l e x pe n dit u r e a m on g cou n t r ie s a r ou n d 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 3
Gross 
